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Abstract: The paper analyzes Russia’s role in Syria’s civil war, and indicates that while Russia’s 
military intervened in the civil war to prevent the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad-led Syrian 
government, it has remained difficult to really understand the ends Russia seeks to achieve from the 
war. This necessitated inquiry into the question of why Russia’s military intervention in Syria’s civil 
war is aimed at keeping President Bashar al-Assad in power. Consequently, the paper discovered six 
different scholarly explanations of this question, which include that: Russia’s military activity in Syria 
aims to protect its geopolitical and geostrategic interests and sphere of influence in the Middle East 
from western encroachment, to advance the conservative orientation of Russia’s ruling elite, to defend 
the United Nations laws on non-intervention and State sovereignty and prevent the institutionalization 
of a wrong interventionist precedent the West will readily exploit in the future, to crush Islamist 
fundamentalism and Jihadist ideology, to pursue realist ambitions, and to implement self-help 
measures that will guarantee its survival. The paper concludes that, of these six explanations, the 
realist explanation offers the most compelling answer to Russia’s goal in Syria’s civil war because it 
forms the basis other explanations are built upon. 
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1. Introduction  
Russia’s direct military involvement in the on-going civil war in Syria has raised 
concerns as to what its real motives are. The concerns have resulted in diverse 
detailed explanations in various scholarly circles. The multiplicity of explanations 
and the conflict associated with them reveal the complexity and ambiguity of the 
subject-matter. Thus, it is quite difficult to understand the motivations for Russia’s 
intervention in the Syrian armed conflict as imperialistic interests to remain a 
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strong international player, annihilation of Islamist terrorism and ISIS necessary 
for regional peace and stability, vindictiveness against the United States for its anti-
Russian behaviour since the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and against NATO for its 
anti-Russian action in Ukraine, and support of an ally in trouble from being 
overthrown by armed opposition, are all manifested in Russia’s actions in Syria 
(Salama, 2015). 
Hence, in treating Russia’s role in the Syrian civil war, the study addresses the 
question, “Why is Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian civil war aimed at 
keeping President Bashar al-Assad in power?” Specific attention is given to 
characterizing scholarly explanations of the question. This effort leads to the 
discovery of six sets of scholarly explanations each of which provides a specific 
account for the motives behind Russia’s military activity in Syria. The six sets of 
scholarly explanations are treated as schools of thought as each of them is founded 
on a theoretical framework. The first argues that geopolitical, geo-economic and 
geostrategic interests and sphere of influence in the Middle East which Russia has 
to protect from western encroachment account for Russia’s military intervention in 
Syria’s civil war on the side of the Syrian regime. The second contends that the 
conservative orientation of Russia’s ruling elite is responsible for Russia’s military 
intervention in Syria. The third is based on the legalistic approach and explains that 
Russia intervened in Syria’s civil war in order to uphold the United Nations’ (UN) 
laws on non-intervention and State sovereignty and to prevent the UN from 
creating a precedent which the West can use arbitrarily and abusively in the future 
to interfere in the domestic conflict of any sovereign country with anti-western 
regime, and change the regime.  
With the fourth is the idea that Russia’s abhorrence of Islamist fundamentalism and 
Jihadist ideology is what stirred its involvement in the Syrian civil war on the side 
of the Syrian government, with the motive of obviating the chances of Syria 
becoming an Islamic fundamentalist and Jihadist stronghold. The fifth emphasizes 
realism as the ideology that prompted Russia to intervene in the Syrian civil war as 
it prioritizes the use of power in the form of military force against western 
opposition in order to protect its national interests and preserve its national survival 
in an unfriendly international system. The sixth set of scholarly explanations holds 
that Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war is based on the need to apply the 
self-help principle for self-defence and self-preservation, which Russia found to be 
imperative at the material time it entered the civil war. The paper accepts that the 
realist school of thought best explains Russia’s role in the Syrian civil war because 
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it explains the power-politics of states in the hostile international system as means 
to ends, and also forms the basis upon which the analysis of other schools of 
thought derive meaning. 
 
2. Russia Responds to Bashar al-Assad’s SOS Call  
The diplomatic relations between the former Soviet Union – now Russia – and 
Syria, which were established in July 1944 and ratified in February 1946, have 
become a strategic cornerstone of co-operation between the two countries. The 
relations developed into a close bond following the ratification in 1971 of a treaty 
between the former Soviet Union and Hafiz al-Assad-led Syria, which allowed the 
Soviet Union to establish a naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus; a facility 
Russia, the legal successor of the Soviet Union, continues to use up to now. Since 
that time, the two countries have maintained reliable and mutually beneficial 
relations. In 2011, the most recent revolution in the Arab World of North Africa 
and the Middle East (NAME), called the Arab Spring, erupted in Tunisia on 17 
December 2010 due to the dismal domestic condition of the country, and quickly 
pervaded to other NAME countries one of which is Syria where a ferocious civil 
war is going on currently.  
Russia had earlier limited its roles in the Syrian civil war to providing the Syrian 
government with diplomatic support, arms and ammunition supplies and other 
military equipment and facilities, and to offering training and military advisory 
services to the Syrian military which is confronted by a vast number of Syrian rebel 
groups. However, as the civil war continued to escalate, the Islamist terrorist 
groups and the moderate opposition’s Free Syrian Army (FSA) continued to make 
more and more territorial and material gains amidst huge losses of territories and 
most essential materials as well as dampened morale of soldiers and mounting 
hopelessness on the part of the Syrian regime – which had caused it to retreat from 
as far as the coastal province of Latakia to defend Damascus heavily – it became 
necessary for the Syrian government, when in September 2015 it looked like 
Bashar al-Assad had only few weeks in power, to officially invited Russia that 
same month to intervene in the civil war to help combat Islamist terrorist groups, 
especially ISIS. The direct intervention of Russia at the time Bashar al-Assaed 
faced a real threat of overthrow by a formidable alliance of the FSA and Islamist 
militant groups which has audaciously captured strategic territories from the Syrian 
army in quick succession, became the game-changer in favour of the Syrian 
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regime. Russia thinks it fit to fight terrorism in Syria so as to prevent the re-
emergence of terrorism in its North Caucasus region which has been prone to 
terrorist activities. Also, it believes that the Syrian government has to be protected 
militarily in order not to be overthrown by rebels or terrorists because it is the 
legitimately elected government of Syria and also because overthrowing the 
government will plunge Syria into chaos. Hence, the Russian Aerospace Forces 
started a sustained airstrike campaign against both ISIS and the anti-Assad FSA 
beginning from 30 September 2015 (“Syria conflict: Russia launches fresh strikes”, 
2015). While the intervention of Russia on the side of the Syrian government 
makes the Syrian armed forces more optimistic, the civil war has continued to drag 
on without the hope of resolution. 
  
3. Geopolitical Interest Matters Much to Russia 
Certain explanations for the reasons Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war is 
aimed at keeping President Bashar al-Assad in power centre on the Geopolitics 
School of thought. While the concept of geopolitics was understood by classic 
scholars such as Aristotle, Montesquieu, Kant, Hegel and Humboldt (Cohen, 
2003), the term was conceptualized in 1899 as “Geopolitik” by the Swedish scholar 
Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922) who defined it as “the theory of the state as a 
geographic organism or phenomenon in space” (Cohen, 2015, p. 15). Important to 
this definition are “State” and “geography/space”. For Haushofer who popularized 
the term, 
Geopolitics is the science of conditioning of political processes by the earth. It is 
based on the broad foundations of geography, especially of political geography, as 
the science of political space organisms and their structure. The essence of regions 
as comprehended from the geographical point of view provides the framework for 
geopolitics within which the course of political processes must proceed if they are 
to succeed in the long term. Though political leaders will occasionally reach 
beyond this frame, the earth dependency will always eventually exert its 
determining influence. As thus conceived, geopolitics aims to be equipment for 
political action and a guidepost in political life … Geopolitics wants to and must 
become the geographical conscience of the state (Tuathail, 1996, pp. 46-47).  
Geopolitics also refers to the relationship between power politics and geography 
(Child, 1985). “Geopolitics is the analysis of the interaction between, on the one 
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hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other, political processes 
… Both geographical settings and political processes are dynamic, and each 
influences and is influenced by the other” (Cohen, 2003, p. 12).  It is, at the level of 
international relations, a method of studying foreign policy to understand, explain 
and predict international political behaviour through geographical variables such as 
area studies, climate, topography, demography, natural resources and applied 
science of the region being evaluated (Evans & Newnham, 1998). Furthermore, 
geopolitics “is the study of international relations from a spatial or geographical 
perspective” (Parker, 1998). The thrust of this school is that geographical factors 
are key determinants of the external political behaviour of the State in terms of use 
of power. Important areas of geopolitics are geo-economics (which embraces 
maritime geopolitical perspective and resource geopolitical perspective) and 
geostrategy (which covers continental, aerospace and maritime geopolitical 
perspectives).  
The arguments based on this school indicate that Russia’s military intervention in 
Syria is intended to protect its geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic 
advantages and sphere of influence. In the light of this position, Valenta & Valenta 
(2016) provide some  geostrategic explanations for Russia’s involvement in the 
Syrian civil war: the explanations centre on Russia’s security and defence concerns 
within its geopolitical sphere, among others. The main reason Russia is directly 
involved in the Syrian civil war is to reclaim its geopolitical and geostrategic 
sphere of influence around its near-abroad of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 
This is critical to consolidating on Russia’s reclaimed seaport of Sevastopol and 
passage for its naval forces. Like previous Russian leaders dating back to centuries 
such as Peter the Great, the involvement of Russia in the Syrian civil war is 
President Putin’s deliberate action to reclaim and protect Russia’s strategic 
interests inclusive of the country’s regional economic zone as well as geopolitical 
and defence interests, knowing that his country has the particular natural 
geopolitical disadvantage of lack of considerable access to the sea for its naval 
forces, especially on the western side. 
During the Soviet era, Russia benefited enormously from controlling naval ports 
and other military facilities in strategic maritime locations such as the Baltic region 
and the Black Sea; in the latter it had a warm-water naval port in the coastal waters 
of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as the Ochamchire warm-water naval port in the 
coastal waters of Abkhazia, Georgia. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, 
Russia had to transfer ownership and control of these coastal naval ports to new 
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post-Soviet republics in whose territories they are located. This development made 
the naval power of the essentially closed-in Russia to become seriously threatened. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union was a great disaster for Russia as the country 
forfeited not only naval ports and other military assets but also lost control of its 
near-abroad, thereby incurring huge geopolitical, geostrategic, military and 
economic losses.  
Russia’s military action in Syria, therefore, is part of President Putin’s extensive 
policy of reclamation of Russia’s lost sphere of influence and strategic advantages. 
This effort started in 2005 with victory in the second Chechen war, it followed 
through the 2008 invasion of Georgia’s region of Abkhazia to regain control of 
Abkhazia’s port of Ochamchire on the Black Sea coast, the reconstruction of its 
Tartus port in Syria and modernization of naval facility there in 2008 and 2009, the 
invasion and annexation of Crimea in Ukraine in 2014, and conduced to the 
staunch support for pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk regions of 
Ukraine which are now self-declared new republics. Essentially, “His [Putin’s] aim 
seemed clear: re-establishing Russia’s presence in the Black Sea and through the 
Turkish Straits to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean and Middle East in littoral 
Russian Azov and Black Sea coastal areas…” (Valenta & Valenta, 2016, p. 15). 
Russia’s interest in the Mediterranean is vitally important for military strategy. 
Russia’s permanent naval base in the western Syrian port of Tartus, that is, on 
Syria’s Eastern Mediterranean coast, is strategically important to Russia as it is 
Russia’s only surviving military facility in the Middle East and the last of such 
outside the former Soviet space that services Russia’s warships and provides its 
navy direct access to the friendly waters of the Mediterranean Sea since the Cold 
War ended. The naval base is very indispensable for Russia’s economic interest, 
strategic posture, and military activity in the unfreezing Mediterranean waters. 
Russia’s support for the Syrian government goes beyond its interest in Syria; it 
extends to protecting its geostrategic interests in the entire Middle East (Buckley, 
2012; Lesch, 2012; Mankoff, 2012; Nasser-Eddine, 2012; Zifcak, 2012; Janik, 
2013; Jafarova, 2014; Plakoudas, 2015; Rafizadeh, 2015; Perišić, 2017). Russia’s 
naval presence in Syria’s Mediterranean coast is linked to its economic interest in 
the region. Its provision of diplomatic and military supports for Bashar al-Assad 
respectively in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and in the fight 
against the Syrian opposition is intended to protect its military asset in Syria’s port 
of Tartus which is near to “the oil terminal of the Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan pipeline 
from where huge amounts of oil are being shipped to Western Europe” (Janik, 
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2013, p. 82). This signals Russia’s possible exercise of influence over energy 
export from the Middle East to Europe in the future. This also strengthens alliance 
between Russia and Iran in the broader opposition to the United States and the 
Sunni Muslim extensive influence in the Middle East (Janik, 2013; Khatib, 2014). 
President Putin wants Russia to remain an indispensible power in the Middle East 
in order to continue to influence decision-making for the entire region, as this 
serves Russia’s geopolitical and geostrategic interests. The armed revolution in the 
Middle East triggered by the Arab Spring and calling for democracy poses a 
serious threat to these national interests of Russia. Given that Syria under Bashar 
al-Assad is probably Russia’s only surviving stronghold in the post-Cold War era, 
through which it can expand its influence in the Middle East and thus remain 
vitally important in decision-making for the region, Russia had to intervene in the 
Syrian civil war so as to prevent the largely Sunni-dominated anti-Russia 
opposition from seizing power as doing so would jeopardize Russia’s national 
interests (Mankoff, 2012). While Russia’s arms trade with Syria is important to the 
bilateral relations between the two countries, and the overthrow of the Assad 
regime is expected to put in danger this aspect of Russia-Syria relations, in actual 
fact Russia’s arms sales to Syria is less important now than before as it has dropped 
to 5 percent of Russia’s global arms sales since 2011. Hence, rather than arms trade 
with Syria, what is more significant to Russia in its relations with Syria and for 
which it strongly stands by the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria’s civil war are its 
wider strategic interests in the political geography around Syria, and the fear of the 
adverse impact the overthrow of the Assad-led Shi’i Alawite rule in Syria by 
rebellious groups of Sunni Muslims supported by their western and Gulf States 
allies will have on Russia’s position in the Middle East (Allison, 2013). 
Several western thinking that Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war is 
essentially motivated by the desire to protect its naval port in Tartus and to keep up 
arms trade with Syria, is wrong. Rather, Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil 
war, helping Bashar al-Assad to remain in power, is for a different and greater 
purpose which is a struggle in defence of the geopolitical and geostrategic interests 
of remaining indispensable in decision-making on matters concerning the entire 
Arab region. Assad’s Syria is likely the only guarantor of these interests since after 
the collapse of allied regimes in the Arab World, Syria is possibly “the last bastion 
of Moscow’s influence in the Arab World, one that many Russians … are loathe to 
see disappear” (Mankoff, 2012, p. 259). Russia hopes that with secure and effective 
control over Syria, it can restore in post-Soviet time its Soviet-era position of 
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influence in the entire Middle East. Particularly, Russia seeks to present itself as a 
major broker in the reconciliation process between Israel and its Arab enemies, and 
to balance both sides by building good relations with them just as it has already 
achieved building relations with Israel and Iran. The ultimate goal of raising its 
status and power in the region is to be on a par with the United States. Russia’s 
strong emphasis on respect for State sovereignty and on UNSC sole leadership in 
managing internal conflicts can be correctly viewed from the perspective of its 
strategic and security interests in the Middle East. 
President Putin’s intervention in the Syrian civil war to protect the ally regime of 
Bashar al-Assad is basically about protecting Russia’s geopolitical and geostrategic 
interests in the Middle East. These interests are considered essential to achieving 
certain ends such as national security, economic prosperity, restoration of global 
strategic balance of power, prevention of Islamist extremist terrorism and unrest in 
Russia’s North Caucasus and, ultimately, the revival of Russia’s superpower status 
which was lost when the Cold War ended (Plakoudas, 2015).   Russia’s 
intervention in the Syrian civil war is only a tip of the ice berg as President Putin 
has broader geopolitical interests in the Middle East. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the attendant end of the Cold War and decline of Russia’s global 
power, the United States – the acclaimed victor – has leap-frogged by means of 
opportunism to acquire ex-Soviet geopolitical sphere of influence in Russia’s 
peripheral territories, markedly Eastern Europe and the Middle East, thereby 
reversing the Cold War era strategic balance of power between it and Russia. By 
fighting in Syria, President Putin, so ardent about geopolitics, is carrying on his 
broader fight to restore to Russia its lost geopolitical sphere of influence, re-
establish global balance of power, consolidate on its alliance with Egypt, Iran and 
Syria, contain United States’ global expansionism and strategy in the Middle East, 
and eventually establish “a multipolar world in which the United States will have 
to share power with Russia and other powers [e.g. China]” rather than remain the 
only global superpower (Plakoudas, 2015, pp. 36-37). Russia sees maintaining a 
stronghold over Syria as essential in realizing these lofty goals. Hence, it risks 
great losses if it does not rescue the Bashar al-Assad regime, its last Arab ally, after 
NATO aided the overthrow of the other – Muammar Gaddafi of Libya.  
Russia seeks to protect its; geopolitical interest built around a reliable mutual 
strategic and geopolitical relationship between Moscow and Damascus since the 
time of the Cold War which has helped Russia and Syria to maintain balance of 
power against the anti-Russian and anti-Syrian geopolitical interests of the United 
ISSN: 2065-0272                                                             RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
101 
States and its western allies in the Middle East (Rafizadeh, 2015). Russia pursues 
geostrategic interests in the Middle East in the form of supporting the Alawite 
minority government of Syria. As the Shiite-Sunni proxy war between Shiite 
Muslim Iran and Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabia finds a new expression in the Syrian 
civil war underlined by Shiite regime and Sunni opposition armed conflict, Russia, 
lacking allies among Sunni Arab countries in the Middle East, is bent on 
supporting the alternative, that is the Shiite Arab countries, and thus stands 
alongside Iran and Hezbollah to defend the Alawite Shiite regime of Bashar al-
Assad, being Russia’s only reliable ally in the Middle East,  from western and 
Sunni Muslim overthrow. The choice of keeping Bashar al-Assad in power is to 
enable Russia to continue to wield some power in the Middle East, to shore up its 
dependability and credibility in protecting allies (Janik, 2013).  
Russia wants to prevent the fall of a reliable ally and the potential loss of Russia’s 
influence in the Middle East. While Russia and other actors – the international 
community, China, and the Joint UN-Arab League Special Envoy to Syria, Kofi 
Annan – strongly object to western military intervention against Bashar al-Assad’s 
government given the chaotic and complex nature of the country’s armed conflict, 
Russia particularly rejects western intervention in Syria because of its own interests 
in the country, which include strategic alliance with the Syrian government  and 
political ambition in the evolving new Middle East, among others (Buckley, 2012). 
Russia’s involvement in the civil war is to promote international law and ensure 
security balance in the Middle East. Russia supports Bashar al-Assad regime in 
order to protect its relations with Syria, maintain “international equation” and 
ensure the “security equation in the Middle East” by pursuing its “geopolitical 
goals” according to international norms (Kazemi & Jegarlouii, 2017, pp. 73-74). 
Syria is a core geostrategic country in the Middle East and serves not only as one 
of the few remaining areas from which Russia can exercise influence in Middle 
East affairs but also as a springboard for Russia to rebound into its lost global 
status (Lesch, 2012). Russia is cautious of Saudi Arabia; it is supporting the Assad 
regime because Saudi Arabia – Russia’s old opponent – and other countries are 
supporting the Syrian opposition. Since the Cold War era, Russia has been wary of 
the Saudis as Saudi Arabia has been notorious for opposing the Soviet Union’s 
interests and fighting a proxy war with the Union in the Middle East by providing 
huge financial and military supports to groups the Soviet fought, such as in 
Afghanistan and in Russia’s Chechnya. Now in Syria, Saudi Arabia, a staunch 
supporter of the Syrian rebels, is exploiting the Arab Spring to seek to overthrow 
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Iran’s ally in Syria and establish its own whereas elsewhere, such as Bahrain, it has 
frustrated the Arab Spring because it threatened its allies in power. “Syria has 
become a domestic issue in Russia” so that it shapes Russia’s foreign policy of 
continuous support for Bashar al-Assad even if the regime may collapse eventually 
(Ziadeh, Hadar, Katz, & Heydemann, 2012, p. 9).  
Under the Geopolitics School, another set of explanations for Russia’s pro-Assad 
involvement in the Syrian civil war relates to geo-economics. Geo-economics 
embraces maritime and resource geopolitical perspectives, and has to do with the 
economic or resource factors in and of any geographical features such as land, 
water, etc. For the economic significance of any geographical features, nations 
strive to exercise control directly or indirectly over such features and use their 
power to maintain influence over them. Accordingly, it is argued that, rather than 
politics per se, Russia’s motive for intervening in the Syrian civil war is to protect 
its economic interests in Syria. Russia’s endeavour to keep Bashar al-Assad in 
power is believed to particularly protect its geo-economic (mainly natural gas) 
interests in Syria and in the broader Middle East – which reinforces the 
sustainability of its monopolistic supply of natural gas to Europe – as these 
interests are threatened by the United States’ position and action in Syria. Russia’s 
action in the Syrian civil war aims to prevent the United States from stopping its 
control of natural gas in Syria. The question 
“who controls whose natural gas flow via whose territories?” (Güner & Koç, 2017, 
p. 1) is fundamental to understanding the mutually contradictory geo-economic 
interests of the United States and Russia, for which the former wants the Syrian 
government toppled and a Kurdish State created and for which the latter wants the 
reverse as the case. There is an irreconcilable struggle between the United States 
and Russia over geo-economic interest in Europe and the Middle East. Russia’s 
economic importance to Europe is enormous because it is practically the only 
supplier of natural gas to Europe which depends so much on this vital energy. The 
United States is envious of this seeming dominant economic influence Russia has 
over Europe and is plotting to weaken it by its actions in Syria.  
The United States, contrary to Russia’s interest, is enormously supporting the 
Kurdish rebels in Syria militarily, technically and politically to achieve 
independence from Syria. It hopes that the actualization of this ambition would 
create an alternative natural gas route to Europe as Russia will have neither a voice 
nor influence in matters of geopolitics and geo-economics around the envisioned 
Kurdistan whose people are already allied with the United States. Russia’s control 
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of the huge deposit of natural gas in northern Syria, its underground transnational 
conduit pipelines in Syria and its leverage in the region’s geopolitical affairs would 
be useless if this US goal is achieved. This US ambivalence towards Russia 
underlines the United States strong support for the planned alternative Qatar 
pipeline. Russia’s military involvement in the Syrian civil war is therefore 
primarily intended to frustrate this US malignant stratagem against it. To keep 
Bashar al-Assad in power, to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria and to thwart 
the emergence of an independent Kurdish State that will have the United States as 
chief patron, constitute Russia’s vitally important policy for Syria that will 
safeguard its geopolitical influence in the Near East and maintain its monopolistic 
position of being the greatest exporter of natural gas to Europe (Güner & Koç, 
2017). 
Besides security and defence concerns, Russia sees its geo-economic interest in 
Syria as crucially important. Many Russian enterprises have invested heavily in 
Syria’s oil and natural gas industry and have underground pipelines conducting 
these resources from Syria to Europe through Russian energy-dependent States in 
the Caucasus, and Ukraine. Russia believes only Bashar al-Assad regime can 
guarantee these investments and interests in Syria. This is a matter of serious 
concern for Russia as it is primarily dependent on petroleum and gas for its 
survival, and as “seventy percent of Russia’s foreign income comes from oil and 
gas exports [and] sixty percent of the state budget is from energy export revenues” 
(Valenta & Valenta, 2016, p. 7). Russia’s behaviour in the Syrian armed conflict is 
dictated by President Putin’s motives of protecting Russia’s political, economic 
and strategic interests in Syria, and by the significance of Syria’s location in the 
Middle East. For instance, Syria alone buys six percent of Russia’s global arms and 
military equipment exports and has proposed to buy “fighter jets and advanced 
missiles … estimated to be worth some US$4 billion” while Russia has 
investments in “pipeline and a liquefied natural gas processing facility 200 
kilometres east of Homs.” Besides, “in the Middle East, Syria is of enormous 
strategic significance. Libya was not” (Zifcak, 2012, p. 91). This informs Russia’s 
tenacious commitment to preserve the allied Syrian regime. 
Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war is aimed at securing a strategic 
position for itself in the new politics of geo-economics of the Middle East with 
respect to natural gas and petroleum export to Europe. Russia enjoys its status as 
the sole exporter of natural energy resources to Europe via underground pipelines. 
This geopolitical leverage and national interest is threatened as the European Union 
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(EU) seeks to reduce its excessive dependency on Russia for these all-important 
energy needs by seeking alternative sources and routes in the Middle East through 
East Mediterranean. This point is vividly captured in the following excerpt:  
The recent discovery of vast energy reserves in the exclusive economic zones of 
Egypt and Israel (the Zhor and Leviathan hydrocarbon reserves respectively) has 
radically changed the energy landscape of the region. This development has created 
opportunities and risks for Russia, a “petro-state” whose federal budget depends 
critically on energy exports; in fact, 68 percent of the total revenues in 2013 
originated from natural gas and oil exports. Russia is concerned that the energy-
thirsty Europe is seeking other sources of oil and natural gas that will reduce its 
over-dependency on Russia for its hydrocarbon needs. In fact, the EU has approved 
certain energy projects (e.g. the TAP pipeline) and even considered favorably the 
construction of the East-Med pipeline, which would ideally transport natural gas 
from the vast reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean to the EU through Cyprus and 
Greece. By intervening in Syria and allying itself with Egypt, Moscow has 
acquired a strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean and, therefore, the 
peripheral players (Turkey, Israel, Egypt, as well as the EU) cannot ignore Russia 
in their future designs about the new energy Eldorado (Plakoudas, 2015, p. 36). 
Russia wants to exercise power and influence in “the Fertile Crescent” of “Iran, 
Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon” where more than 50 percent of the world’s oil reserves 
are situated” in order to compete symmetrically with the United States in its 
traditional “sphere of influence” and to further use this gained ground to project 
itself as a re-emergent world power that can no longer be reduced to a mere 
regional power restrained only to its former Soviet sphere of Eastern Europe 
(Plakoudas, 2015, p. 35). Russia’s economic interests cover areas such as 
petroleum and natural gas exploration and processing investment, as well as arms 
sales and service. Russia has made direct investments in business and infrastructure 
necessary for the “production of energy extraction equipment, agricultural 
equipment, aviation, automobile components and tourism” (Avenäs, 2016, p. 31). 
Russia’s investments in Syria’s tourism, energy and infrastructure sectors reached 
$19.4 billion in 2009 only. It makes huge economic gains of roughly $5 billion 
from continuous armament sales to the al-Assad regime as Syria remains a major 
Middle East market for Russia’s weapons after Russia lost billions of dollars in 
arms trade with Iran in keeping with UN sanction against the country, and Libya 
due to the deposition of Gaddafi from power (Lesch, 2012; Nasser-Eddine, 2012; 
Buckley, 2012; Jafarova, 2014; Rafizadeh, 2015; Perišić, 2017).  
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It is clear that even though Russia rejects and decries external military intervention 
in a sovereign State’s internal affairs as flagrant abuse of international law, it is 
doing so with respect to Syria for its own national interests and establishments in 
the country which it believes can only be guaranteed with Bashar al-Assad 
remaining in power. For these political, strategic and economic reasons Russia has 
refused to support any proposal to invoke the UN principle of “Responsibility to 
Protect” against the Syrian government (Zifcak, 2012: 91).  Accordingly, Russia 
does not want NATO’s military intervention in Syria because it has its own vital 
national economic, business, military, diplomatic and strategic interests and assets 
to protect in the country, and is desirous of reviving its alliances in the Middle East 
amidst saving an ally with whom it built and enjoys steady, robust and mutually 
beneficial relations which started during the Cold War and has developed into 
profitable military, economic and political co-operations for both sides since Hafez 
al-Assad regime (Kildron, 2012; Lesch, 2012; Nasser-Eddine, 2012; Avenäs, 2016; 
Perišić, 2017).  
Generally, Russia is perceived especially in the West and in some countries in the 
Middle East as the hindrance to international efforts to resolve the Syrian civil war 
by repeatedly vetoing anti-Assad UNSC draft resolutions in order to protect its own 
geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic interests (Buckley, 2012; Lesch, 2012; 
Lynch & Fordham, 2012; Nasser-Eddine, 2012; Zifcak, 2012; Jafarova, 2014; 
Plakoudas, 2015; Valenta & Valenta, 2016), However, Russia’s intervention in 
Syria’s civil war is ambiguous as the country’s actions in Syria are rift with 
contradictions. Many scholars disagree with the afore-stated proposition and argue 
instead that Russia has little geo-economic and geostrategic interests in Syria and 
thus has no reason to constitute a hindrance to the resolution of the Syrian civil war 
(Inozemtsev, as cited in Brown, 2014, p. 56; Ziadeh, Hadar, Katz, & Heydemann, 
2012; Pukhov, 2012; Hill, 2013; Trenin, 2013; Vysotsky, 2014; and Ramani, 
2015). 
 
4. Conservative Russian Ruling Elite Abhors Revolution in Syria  
The second set of explanations for Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war on 
the side of the Syrian regime relates to the argument of the Conservative School, 
which in its Anglophone version and tradition originated with Edmund Burke. 
Conservatism refers to “the ideas and beliefs of people who support established 
ideas [and institutions] and are against sudden change” (Holmes, 2004, pp. 51-52). 
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It is “an ideology of system maintenance which, depending on what is to be 
conserved … may or may not automatically be promotive of the society’s well-
being, but definitely tantamount to reaction if in conditions of needed social or 
revolutionary change. [It is] in various degrees, the opposite of reformism, social 
change, and revolution” (Igwe, 2007, p. 86). Furthermore, conservatism is – 
dedicated to maintaining the structure and institutions of a society threatened by … 
social unrest … Conservatism arises directly from the sense that one belongs to 
some continuing, and preexisting social order, and that this fact is all important in 
determining what to do … Conservatism presupposes the existence of a social 
organism. Its politics is concerned with sustaining the life of that organism, through 
sickness and health, change and decay … the bond of society – as the conservative 
sees it – is just such a ‘transcendent’ bond, and it is inevitable that the citizen will 
be disposed to recognize its legitimacy, will be disposed, in other words, to bestow 
authority upon the existing order (Scruton, 1980, pp. 15, 21, 25, & 33). 
While conservatism admits the inevitability of societal change, it abhors drastic and 
sudden change. O’Hara (as cited in Andreasson, 2014, p. 1) emphasizes this point 
in stating that, conservatives do not simply reject and resist all forms of change in 
social, political and economic arrangements of any given society. Instead they 
accept that change is inevitable and have articulated a distinct approach to 
identifying and understanding circumstances in which change might contribute to 
resolving contradictions and discord in existing arrangements. In doing so, 
conservatives aim to aid in the preservation of institutions and practices, rather than 
rendering them unviable and thus tearing them asunder by rejecting any change at 
all.  
Similarly, “conservatism as an ideology, then, is characterized in the first instance, 
by opposition to the idea of total or radical change, and not by the absurd idea of 
opposition to change as such, or by any commitment to preserving all existing 
institutions” (O’Sullivan, 1976, p. 9). The school is opposed to revolution. In light 
of this, it is stated that “The revolutionary vision stands in sharp contrast to the 
conservative sentiment, is indeed its anti-thesis … Where revolutionaries 
succeeded in bringing down existing order, radicalism habitually gave birth to 
terrors greater than those which revolutionaries sought to end” (Andreasson, 2014, 
pp. 6-7). 
Against the backdrop of the Conservative argument, scholars contend that Russia’s 
involvement in the Syrian civil war can be explained by the conservative 
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disposition of Russia’s ruling elite who abhors revolution or a drastic violent 
revolution. To this, Baev (2011) argues that Russia is fighting in Syria to 
counteract the revolution against the Syrian regime and also to halt the course of 
the Arab Spring from engulfing authoritarian States in the broader Middle East 
where it seek to build friendship. He disagrees with the idea that Russia’s 
involvement in the Syrian civil war is about economic (oil) interest in the Middle 
East, because Russia is already a dependable exporter of oil and gas. Rather, 
Russia’s military activity in Syria is a demonstration of its repulsion for revolution 
against the Middle East’s historic authoritarian political system which it benefits 
from. Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war only to consolidate on President 
Putin’s successes in fighting against insurgency, which is deemed necessary to 
maintain stability and order in Russia because the Russian government thinks that 
victory for insurgents in the Arab World will likely incite similar revolution against 
the largely authoritarian political structure in Russia. 
With its anti-revolution war and posture in Syria and in the entire Middle East, as 
well as its solidarity with the Bashar al-Assad regime and improved relations with 
other conservative regimes in the wider Middle East in times of region-wide fears 
of revolution amidst abandonment of allies by the United States as seen in Egypt, 
Russia seeks to win over the traditionally pro-western leaders of the Middle East 
who are already wary of the West for failing to achieve democratization of the 
region and for throwing Libya into chaos (Baev, 2011). Russians are afraid of 
losing the most reliable strategic ally in the Middle East. This makes the Russian 
government to be disinterested in external military intervention in Syria. Russia 
worries that if the western-backed opposition overthrows the Syrian government, 
the opposition-led government will align Syria with the West, especially Russia’s 
greatest rival, the United States, to the total detriment of Russia. Since only Bashar 
al-Assad government can guarantee the continuous protection of Russia’s interests 
in Syria, Russia cannot afford to allow the ouster of the regime (Rafizadeh, 2015; 
Avenäs, 2016). Russians believe that the United States is in the habit of inciting 
public demonstrations for democratic reforms only to overthrow governments and 
create a very different situation instead. However, the non-intervention of the 
United States in the Syrian civil war directly against the Bashar al-Assad regime 
gives Russia all the latitude to strongly protect the Assad regime (Ziadeh, Hadar, 
Katz, & Heydemann, 2012).  
Russia seeks to preserve stability in the Middle East by preventing the overthrow 
of Bashar al-Assad. It fears the likely aftermath in the event that the Bashar al-
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Assad regime is overthrown. Drawing inferences from the seemingly intractable 
sectarian, socio-political, Jihadist and security crises in post-Hussein Iraq and post-
Gaddafi Libya after US-led interventions, Russia cannot afford the range of 
consequences such as complex sectarian strife, Islamist terrorism, vindictiveness, 
and socio-political, economic and security crises that would plague a post-Assad 
multi-ethnic and sectarian Syria if President Bashar al-Assad is killed or forcefully 
overthrown through foreign intervention (Mankoff, 2012). On regional level, the 
overthrow of the Syrian regime is likely to cause a spillover of the Syrian civil war 
which will destabilize the Middle East, worsen the on-going regional “Sunni-Shiite 
cold war” and threaten weak authoritarian regimes in Central Asia – another 
Russia’s sphere of influence –, and even Russia itself “which has a Muslim 
population of up to 15 million” (Mankoff, 2012, p. 262) particularly in North 
Caucasus where Islamist extremism has constituted a serious national security 
threat to the Russian Federation and in central Russia city of Kazan where Islamist 
terrorism has emerged. While the United States encourages the Arab revolution in 
the hope that it will consequently kick start democratization of the Middle East 
irrespective of inexorable instability, Russia’s seemingly realistic position is that 
the prospect of democracy in the Middle East is not certain in the foreseeable 
future, especially when it is forced from outside, given the region’s deeply 
entrenched authoritarian political system and also given that such prospect lacks 
enabling internal factors currently. In the light of this thinking, Russia decries the 
Arab revolution and objects to, based on hindsight from the Libyan experience and 
as a matter of foreign policy, western-proposed foreign military intervention in 
Syria, but is supportive of respect for State sovereignty and UNSC leadership in 
international conflict management (Mankoff, 2012).  
Russia maintains a conservative abhorrence of revolution and as such it opposes 
the Syrian civil war. It opposes external military intervention and wants to prevent 
the war from escalating into a regional war because it worries that, if a regional war 
eventually occurs, the Russian nation and Russia’s leverage in the Middle East 
could come under threats, especially as democratization, which is the said original 
goal of the Arab Spring, is fast giving way to Islamization. Besides abhorring 
revolution, Russia perceives some selfish ulterior motive in the West’s anti-Assad 
behaviour; it believes the West wants the Assad regime overthrown not particularly 
to benefit the Syrian population, but to punish and contain Iran which is a strong 
ally of Syria. Accordingly, Russia is opposed to external intervention but fully 
supports Syria’s initiative to resolve Syrian conflict. Russia worries that given the 
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Islamist nature of the majority of the Syrian opposition, western support for them 
will likely help to create Syria’s kind of al Qaeda just as the US support for Afghan 
mujahedeen in the latter’s resistance of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 
1980s helped in creating al Qaeda that has hit the United States so hard (Lesch, 
2012). Russia’s diplomacy of consistent advocacy for the preservation of the 
political order in the Middle East for the sake of regional stability and for respect 
for the principle of international law that objects to foreign intervention in domestic 
conflicts of sovereign nations, are aimed to serve its preference for the status quo 
(Plakoudas, 2015).  
Ziadeh, Hadar, Katz, & Heydemann (2012, p. 7) dispute the relevance of the 
mainstream knowledge that the reasons Russia is firmly supporting the Bashar al-
Assad regime are because of “Russian arms relationship with Syria that it fears it 
might lose; Russian investments in the Syrian petroleum sector; the naval facility 
that Russia has at Tartus, the only one it has outside the former Soviet Union”, 
which it fears it would lose if the Assad regime collapses. Instead, they argue, 
based on majority of responses they garnered from an interview with Russian 
experts and western journalists in Moscow, that the reason the Russian government 
is firmly supporting the Assad regime with the approval of Russians is because the 
generality of Russians are disgusted by the United States’ endless campaigns of 
destroying society and civilization in Middle East countries as has happened in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, and also because they strongly believe that it is the 
intention of the United States to also destroy Syria and throw it into chaos. 
Russians believe, moreover, that the United States is deliberately destroying these 
countries located comparatively very close to Russia with a malicious ultimate goal 
of harming Russia in particular while itself is far secure away across great oceans.  
Russia’s military involvement in the Syrian civil war to protect the Syrian regime 
is intended to stop the United States from executing in Syria its perilous and self-
serving ambition to impose democracy externally on the traditionally conservative 
and authoritarian Middle East countries, by means of discriminatory military 
invasion and/or overthrow of non-ally (pro-Russian) regimes. This ambition is 
pursued in fulfillment of US “Greater Middle East” plan – a subset of the Middle 
East Policy formulated by the George Bush Jnr administration in the first half of 
the 2000s – intended supposedly to take development and modernization to the 
Middle East. Russians believe that the Arab Spring is only a negative physical 
manifestation of a remote and continuous US policy to impose democratization on 
the Middle East, which eventually turns out to be destabilizing. Hence, while the 
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Arab Spring assumed regional and international dimensions, Russia perceives the 
West who came brazenly and swiftly to the support of rebel forces in their 
rebellion, claiming democracy, as actually camouflaging behind the Spring to aid 
willing and ostensibly pro-democracy rebels in order to overthrow the non-ally 
regime in Syria in the name of helping to institutionalize democracy, which will be 
nothing but a travesty (Vysotsky (2014, p. 46).  
The Arab Spring fortunately provides the opportunity the United States and other 
western countries seek to be able to further the “Greater Middle East” plan in order 
to advance their own geopolitical interest of comfortably having allies and securing 
control over virtually the whole Middle East to Russia’s detriment.  Russia has 
historical evidences which show that everywhere the United States had carried out 
military invasion and/or regime change in the Middle East supposedly to establish 
and institutionalize democracy, the consequences have always been a charade of 
democracy, as well as socio-economic and sectarian crises. Thus, it wants to stop 
the West from imposing democracy on Syria, as it repudiates their success in doing 
the same thing in some other Middle East countries (Vysotsky, 2014: 46). Russia’s 
military activity in Syria aims to halt the course of the Arab Spring as the Russian 
government fears the Arab Spring might spill over to Russia (MacFarquhar, 2011; 
Ajami, 2012). On the contrary, several Russian sources state that Moscow’s foreign 
policy towards Syria is not because Russia fears that the Arab Spring threatens 
Russia’s elite interests (Fel’gengauer, as cited in Brown, 2014, p. 56) as Russia’s 
characteristics vary distinctively from those of the Arab nations, but because 
Russia believes that the rebellion against the Syrian government will not produce 
democracy (Morozov, as cited in Brown, 2014, p. 56). Russia does not trust the 
West anymore after the dismal Libyan experience it regretted and, as such, is not 
willing to capitulate to western pressure or support their draft resolution for 
intervention in Syria, even if it does not explicitly refer to military action against 
Bashar al-Assad. Russia’s position is strengthened by the fact that so many Syrians 
reject drastic regime change and external military intervention in their country 
(Janik, 2013).  
 
5. Russia Wants to Defend UN Principles and International Law 
Another body of scholarly arguments as to the reason Russia is involved in the 
Syrian civil war rests on the third, Legalistic, school. The school sees legalism as 
being malleable by the State or political actors either for a selfish or altruistic end. 
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On the one hand, legalism explains crafty deployment of extant laws in politics as a 
cover for ignorance, or as a means to project unpopular ideas or to pursue 
unreasonable ends. It is an exercise of pedantry and a preference for the 
technicality of law over the spirit of law in such a crafty manner that promotes 
selfish ends against justice. Legalism involves the manipulation of the 
interpretative meaning of law in order to defend conservatism by States opposed to 
change even when change is pragmatically necessary. In sum, it is “mainly an anti-
revolutionary and anti-progressive doctrine at the service of those who … wish to 
conceal the immorality of certain actions, and the injustices of a policy” (Igwe, 
2007, pp. 228-229). Therefore, it is argued by some scholars that Russia’s legalistic 
attitude towards the Syrian civil war, including its firm insistence on respect for 
UN’s principles and international laws, is merely a cover to pursue its selfish 
interests in Syria, one of which is to have President Bashar al-Assad remain in 
power. On the other hand, however, legalism may be deployed altruistically and 
justly by beneficent and honest political leaders who have preference for justice 
over opportunism in ensuring the maintenance of stability in a complicated 
situation (Igwe, 2007). As regards this, it is contended that Russia’s resolute 
defence of UN’s principles and international laws in preventing western military 
intervention in Syria’s civil war is the most prudent action altruistically motivated 
for the good of Syria and the entire Middle East because by such action, Russia 
helps in forestalling a bigger conflict with region-wide ramifications.   
This understanding lends credence to the arguments under this school which state 
that by intervening in the Syrian civil war, Russia demonstrates its firm defence of 
UN’s legal institutions particularly its international laws concerning non-
intervention and State sovereignty. By defending UN’s legal institutions, therefore, 
Russia wants to protect the Syrian government from forceful foreign overthrow and 
to prevent the creation by the UNSC of a precedent that will allow the United 
States and its western allies to use NATO to arbitrarily intervene in the domestic 
conflict of a less powerful sovereign country and change regime, in the name of 
implementing “Responsibility to Protect” but actually furthering their own selfish 
ideological, national and geopolitical interests. Russia demonstrates strong 
opposition to foreign military intervention and regime change in Syria. It strongly 
accentuates the primacy and imperative of upholding the principles of sovereignty 
of independent State and of non-interference in their domestic matters in order to 
maximize international sympathy and support against the Arab revolution and to 
frustrate it, safeguard its basic anti-revolution interest, and to save its ally, Syrian 
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President Bashar al-Assad, from revolutionary overthrow. President Putin 
argumentatively founds this policy position on the failure of the UNSC mission in 
Libya and on the attendant catastrophe that plague the country (Baev, 2011; Janik, 
2013; Rafizadeh, 2015).  
Russia abhors foreign incursion in Syria, sees the Syrian armed conflict as 
motivated by the West, and wants to defend the principle of sovereignty of States 
(Rather, Ali, & Abbas, 2015). It disapproves of regime change by external forces 
and believes differently that the UNSC’s role is not to be permitting external 
intervention to change a legitimate government of a country with some domestic 
crisis (Charap, 2013). Russia’s military involvement in Syria is based on President 
Putin’s readiness to uphold the principles of non-interference and State sovereignty 
and to stop the cycle of western-inspired crises purported to institute democracy 
but actually aimed at regime change in Middle East countries with anti-western 
(pro-Russian) regimes. Russia’s opposition to external intervention in Syria is 
because the consequences of such interference will be socio-political instability, 
economic crisis and insecurity. The provocative mischief displayed by NATO by 
blatantly abusing the UNSC resolution 1973 in Libya and aiding the assassination 
of Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, was the circumstance that markedly changed 
Russia’s attitude from reluctance, seeming indifference and passivity towards the 
Arab Spring to that of assertiveness, active involvement, and resolute defence of its 
strong belief in the principles of non-interference and respect for the sovereignty of 
independent States (Vysotsky, 2014). Russia also decries the United States’ 
violation of international law by conducting air strikes against ISIL in Syria’s 
airspace and by creating a military presence in Syria without the permission of the 
Syrian government (Avenäs, 2016). 
Russia believes in the defence of two core values of its international identity, which 
are the principles of national sovereignty and multilateralism. Russia wants the 
United States to reframe from harmful interference in Syria’s domestic affairs and 
not to overthrow the Assad regime because the regime is the lawfully instituted and 
UN-recognised government of Syria, as overthrowing it means infringing on 
Syria’s national sovereignty. Russian media describe Russia not as a friend and 
supporter of Bashar al-Assad but as an altruistic player seeking to make peace and 
broker a consensual resolution of the Syrian armed conflict in such a way that leads 
to a coalitional transition government pursuant to elections (Pirogov, as cited in 
Brown, 2014, p. 56; Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2012c). The media describe the 
unbending attitude of the Syrian opposition (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2012d, as cited in 
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Brown, 2014, p. 56) and their western supporters as the hindrances to Russia’s 
effort in this regard, by demanding that Bashar al-Assad must step down before any 
agreement can be reached. This decision to protect Syria’s national sovereignty and 
lawful government from United States’ abuse is strengthened by Russia’s suspicion 
that the United States is not interested in establishing real democracy but in 
spreading its selfish influence everywhere it executes regime change (Ramani, 
2015). Russia is defending the principles of non-interference and State sovereignty 
in Syria by trying to stop external intervention and externally motivated regime 
change in the country (Vysotsky, 2014). Thus, Russia’s resolution to support 
Bashar al-Assad is also a demonstration of its steadfast stand to protect 
international law, regional stability, and the principles of national sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and non-intervention which weaker States need in order to 
survive in a vicious and lawless international system. Against the backcloth of the 
Libyan incident, Russia thinks the West wants to use the UNSC to gain permission 
to oust the al-Assad regime of Syria. On its part, Russia wants to preserve the 
principles of international law in Syria, encourage gradualist change of regime, and 
retaliate against the West over their wrong action in Libya.  
Russia and China are careful not to allow a repetition of the appalling Libyan 
experience in Syria or any form of economic sanctions against the Syrian regime in 
the name of fighting human rights abuse, because they are scared of helping to 
create a norm or model that the West can use against them someday.  Russia 
decries western aggressive approach to the Syrian conflict because it considers the 
West as hypocritical and guileful for virtually ignoring the violent repression by the 
minority Sunni regime in Bahrain against peaceful anti-regime Shia demonstrators 
in the capitol, Manama, while simultaneously leading external support for similar 
protest in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt (Lesch, 2012).  
Three major press in Russia and in the West were used to conduct a comparative 
study of media reporting and portrayal of the Syrian civil war as well as public 
perceptions and attitude in Russia and the West towards the war. The press show 
that contrary to the thinking that Russia rejected western approach towards the 
Syrian armed conflict because it has some special ties with Bashar al-Assad, Russia 
actually rejected western idea of solving the conflict because the idea encourages 
foreign military intervention and overthrow of the government of a sovereign State, 
which goes against the basic principles of the United Nations. Hence, Russia has 
no selfish interests to protect fighting in Syria; instead, “Russia is saving the world 
in Syria” by promoting altruism and protecting the principles of international law 
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from western abuses (Brown, 2014, p. 56). Russia wants to protect the international 
system because, given the horrors in Iraq and Libya following US-led military 
interventions, if the United States plan for a US-led military interference and 
forceful change of Syria’s government is left unchecked, there would be a 
continuation of the United States policy of forcefully changing strong regimes that 
are opposed to the West, using humanitarian concern as an excuse. Forceful regime 
change in Syria will lead to catastrophic consequences because, unlike Libya which 
already has grave post-intervention consequences whilst not strategically located, 
Syria is a strategically located centre of Middle East security such that intractable 
crisis in Syria will harm the entire region’s security (Brown, 2014).  
This is particularly worrisome as Russia believes that the West wants to use the 
principle of “Responsibility to Protect” as pretence to abuse Syria’s national 
sovereignty and overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime. Hence, Russia prefers to 
uphold the principles of national sovereignty of States and of non-interference to 
the principle of “Responsibility to Protect” in the Syrian context. Russia’s 
intervention in the Syrian conflict aims to prevent western military intervention in 
Syria because Russia, just like other BRICS nations, is a traditional defender of the 
principles of national sovereignty of States and of non-interference. It strongly 
opposes any attempt to abuse these principles, especially for selfish reasons.  
Russia accepted the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” with reluctance and the 
suspicion that the West may exploit it to interfere militarily in the domestic 
conflicts of other countries under the guise of humanitarian concerns. Hence, 
Russia opposed and vetoed western draft UNSC resolutions proposing military 
intervention in Syria based on the principle of “Responsibility to Protect”. This is 
because Russia favours national sovereignty over “Responsibility to Protect” and 
believes after the Libya experience that the West wants to intervene in Syria for 
their selfish interests. Rather, Russia prefers a diplomatic settlement of the conflict 
(Staniste, 2015). Its support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in the civil war is not 
because of its military and economic interests in Syria but because it is opposed to 
the US-led western expansion in the Middle East by means of military force and 
open support for anti-regimes forces, as such actions contravene the principles of 
the UN and international law, and have created chaos and instability across the 
region (Pukhov, 2012; Ziadeh, Hadar, Katz, & Heydemann, 2012).  
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6. In Syria, Russia Continues the Fight against Jihad and Islamic 
Fundamentalism 
Fourth, scholarly arguments also state that Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil 
war is motivated by the desire to curb Jihadist activity, sectarianization of the war, 
and other forms of Islamic fundamentalism that characterize the civil war. These 
religious features of the civil war relate to the question of identity and conflict, and 
are thus explained by two schools of thought: primordialism and instrumentalism. 
The primordial school argues that identity, such as ethnicity and religion, 
represents a shared social bond that is firmly entrenched in the social relations and 
psychology of a people, binding them together as one larger collectivity. Ethnic 
values drive mobilization which reflects the emotional and often illogical ideas of 
group solidarity and support (Stack Jr., 1986; Connor, 1993; Smith, 1998; Lake & 
Rothchild, 1998). Also, “in societies where other forms of social solidarity around 
gender, labor or class are weak, ethno-religious mobilization is often an integral 
part of political life” (Hashemi, 2016, p. 67). These identities, which are already 
part of Syria’s political life, are deployed for political and combat mobilization and 
for incitement of people within the camps of the Syrian regime and the Syrian 
rebels towards group solidarity and support because they address the emotional and 
irrational part of the people.  The Syrian civil war is characterized by ethno-
sectarian values leading to Sunni-Shia conflict, Jihad, and other forms of Islamic 
fundamentalism all of which represent primordial identity and value.  
Instrumentalism buttresses the primordial understanding of the Syrian civil war in 
that, like Hashemi (2016, p. 67) notes, these primordial identities are “malleable 
and … defined as part of a political process.” John Dewey (1859-1952), the 
founder of the instrumentalism school, states by way of definition that 
“Instrumentalism is an attempt to establish a precise logical theory of concepts, of 
judgments and inferences in their various forms, by considering primarily how 
thought functions in the experimental determinations of future consequences” 
(Dewey, as quoted in Boydston, 1984, p. 14). Instrumentalism argues that concepts 
such as ethno-religious identity have no consequence themselves. Rather, they are 
manipulated by political leaders, who strive to advance their political and economic 
interests through conflict, to become helpful in achieving goals such as identity-
based mass mobilization, and mass solidarity. For instrumentalists, primordial 
concepts are used by the elite as means to ends (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998; Smith, 
2001; Hashemi, 2016). With regard to the Syrian civil war, the elite in the radical 
rebel groups deploy the sectarian sentiment of their supporters to incite extremist 
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behaviour such as Jihad, terrorism and other atrocity crimes which become 
instrumental in furtherance of their Islamic fundamentalist cause. The promotion of 
Jihad, sectarian sentiment and Islamic fundamentalism in the civil war is the result 
of the personal actions of radical rebel leaders who seek to use these features, 
coupled with their ethno-religious beliefs, as an instrument of mass mobilization 
and solidarity and as a tool for their armed competition for power and resources 
against the Syrian regime, because they find them more effective. They strive to 
use the primordial factors of ethnicity, Islamic fundamentalism and religious 
sectarianism as instrumental means to achieve their revolutionary ends one of 
which is the establishment of an Islamic State based on Islamic religious legal 
system.  
While primordialism states that identity is an objective reality with historical basis 
in the tradition and culture of a people, instrumentalism asserts that identity can be 
manipulated by leaders for mass mobilization and attainment of group goals. Also, 
primordialists believe that identity is social and not conflictual in itself, and that the 
elite and leaders play a critical role in exploiting identity in mass mobilization 
process. In sum, primordial identities such as ethnicity, religion and sectarianism 
are concepts which various rebel leaders, especially radical Islamists ones, deploy 
as an instrument of mass mobilization and solidarity in their fight against the 
Syrian regime which itself perceives the civil war as driven by sectarianism.  
Based on these two schools, scholars debate essentially that Russia’s intervention 
in the Syrian civil war in support of the Syrian regime is inspired by its 
characteristic abhorrence of Islamist fundamentalism, sectarianism and Jihadist 
ideology. The current of these arguments is that Russia’s intervention in the Syrian 
civil war is directed at preventing Jihadist rebel groups from overthrowing the 
Syrian government and from further exploiting Islamic sectarianism to promote 
Islamic fundamentalist activity in the war. It is for this purpose of stemming 
Islamist terrorism and other religious fundamentalist behaviour of some of the 
Syrian rebel groups that the Syrian regime invited Russia in September 2015 to 
intervene in Syria’s civil war. Moreover, Putin’s statement – “Let me remind you 
that thousands of militants, natives of Central Asian countries, with which we have 
no controlled borders, are massing on Syrian territory. It was better to deal with 
them and destroy them over there than confront them with lethal force here [in 
Russia]” (Majumdar, 2018, pp. 6-7) – reinforces Russia’s interest in decimating 
Islamic militants as one of the motivators of Russia’s intervention in the Syrian 
civil war. 
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In the light of this statement, Russia’s involvement in Syria’s civil war is to pursue 
an anti-Islamist extremism interest for its own national security concern. Russia 
rejects regime change in Syria and wants to maintain stability, fearing that the 
toppling of Bashar al-Assad and his secular government will turn Syria into a 
stronghold of Islamic fundamentalism, Jihad, and sectarian violence (Rafizadeh, 
2015). Russia needs to prevent the revival of Islamist extremism, terrorism and 
Jihadist groups as the civil war had turned religious and sectarian. It also has to 
protect its domestic stability and security against anticipated spillover of Syria’s 
Islamist terrorism and Jihad to its territory of North Caucasus from where several 
Chechen Islamist Jihadists had travelled to Syria to fight actively for Islamist 
groups such as the Islamic State and to which they will someday return to instigate 
Islamist Jihad, terrorism and nationalist movement. Russia’s North Caucasus 
region is home to mainly Russian Muslim citizens and the Russian government 
fears that the region is vulnerable to the resurgence of Islamist extremism if 
Islamist groups become victorious in Syria. Russia also needs to prevent Syria’s 
Islamist terrorism from spilling over to Central Asia where it has beefed up 
security for the region’s ruling despotic allies since the Soviet era who have 
become vulnerable presently. By initiating and encouraging a US-Russia led 
international coalition against Islamist Jihad, President Putin seeks to improve 
relations with the West, especially the United States, with a prospect of getting 
them to terminate isolation of Russia and to lift sanctions imposed on it for its 
involvement in the Ukrainian crisis. Decimating the Islamist extremist groups and 
preventing the overthrow of the Syrian regime are critical to this cause (Plakoudas, 
2015; Avenäs, 2016; Kim, 2017). The entrenchment of Islamist terrorism region-
wide is a disturbing possibility Russia cannot allow to happen (Mankoff, 2012).  
Contrary to the mainstream thinking among most western authorities and media 
outlets that the only rationale for Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war is to 
save its old, reliable, Soviet-era ally – the Assad government – from overthrown by 
western military invasion and to protect its own “military contracts and bases” in 
Syria, it has been argued differently that Russia is far less engaged in Syria 
militarily to prevent external military intervention against the Syrian regime. 
Instead, Russia’s involvement in the Syrian armed conflict is far more informed by 
a range of recent events that happened in Russia’s border region and peripheral 
States after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which are detrimental to its national 
interest. The events constitute the basis of Russia’s new attitude towards the Arab 
Spring, and have also shaped Russia’s framework of relations not only with the 
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West in matters concerning Eastern European (former Soviet Republics) countries 
such as Ukraine and Middle East countries like Syria, but also with these particular 
countries themselves in matters concerning its own relations with them (Vysotsky, 
2014, p. 42).  
One of such event is the activity of radical Islam. Radical Islamist/Jihadist groups 
have firmly emerged in some parts of the Middle East and are seeking a regional 
entrenchment. Russia has perpetual suspicion and abhorrence of these groups 
because they constitute a huge menace to its security interests since the Cold War 
era. Russia, for example, has consequently taken measures in its own North 
Caucasus republics of Chechnya and Dagestan, and has supported secular Arab 
regimes of Central Asian countries such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan (to which 
the radical Islamists are opposed) to suppress radical Islam. Given the Jihadist 
character and radical Islamist elements of the Arab Spring, Russia came to the 
acknowledgment that there is congruence between radical Islam and the Spring, 
believing the latter to be the vehicle for reviving, strengthening and pervading the 
former across the Middle East and into Russia. This knowledge thus reawakens the 
old Islamist threat to Russia’s security, integrity and stability. With the premonition 
that the strengthening and spread of radical Islam and Jihadist orientation in Russia 
would be catastrophic for Russian citizens and government, the Russian 
government therefore sees the Arab Spring and the speed at which it is spreading 
upward the Middle East, as a threat.  To this, Russia has become very active in the 
Middle East since February 2013 having once again found the region to be pivotal 
to its security and overall interests (Vysotsky, 2014). 
Given the fact that the conflicts that followed the Arab Spring have only 
strengthened Islamist Jihadism and extremism which constitute a serious threat and 
anathema to the Russian government, there is therefore the common negative 
atmosphere in Russia that the ultimate goal of the Arab Spring and the possible 
aftermath of the Syrian civil war should Bashar al-Assad be defeated will be 
calamitous for the region and for Russia itself. The difficult experiences Russia has 
had fighting Islamist extremism in its North Caucasus make it to believe that 
preserving secular authoritarian governments in the Middle East significantly helps 
in keeping Islamist extremism out of the region or in reducing it to a minimal level. 
This is because Russia has realized the underpinnings of Islamic sectarian strife in 
the Syrian armed conflict, and thinks that a new political system to be established if 
the West-backed revolution and regime change succeed would be a parody of 
democracy that will only foster and fester Islamist extremism (Pukhov, 2012). 
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Russia’s role in the Syrian civil war is difficult to understand, but it is certain 
Russia does not want Jihadist groups to topple the Bashar al-Assad regime because 
having al-Assad in power provides it with the authority to fight in Syria in the 
name of protecting State stability against Islamist attack. Russia’s military 
campaign is intended not necessarily to win a zero-sum game, but to secure a huge 
advantage that will make it a major player above other actors in negotiating the 
future of post-war Syria (Jenkins, 2015).  Russia seeks to protect a vital national 
interest by intensifying national security through incapacitating Islamist extremists 
and terrorists, as well as by counteracting the resurgence of same in its North 
Caucasus region. Importantly, Russia has the responsibility to secure its strategic 
alliance with Syria by protecting Barshar al-Assad regime – an age-long reliable 
ally – from Islamist overthrow (Perišić, 2017). 
With regards to his multipolar interest and multilateral approach to solving 
international conflict, Russian President Putin is using the influence and successes 
earned while supporting Bashar al-Assad in his war against Islamist extremism to 
build a multilateral coalition of European and Middle East countries against 
Jihadist groups.  By urging  the West to stop supporting the opposition as several 
Jihadists have joined its ranks and because the Syrian government is the only 
credible party fighting Jihadists, Putin wants the West to accept and co-operate 
with the Bashar al-Assad regime in a collective fight against Jihadists given that 
Assad, despites several difficulties and losses, has maintained effective control 
over the Syrian national army which is distinguished by its unity and loyalty to the 
regime as the only force effectively fighting Islamist extremist groups (Ramani, 
2015).  
Since it started supporting Bashar al-Assad, Russia has been demonstrating to the 
world that it leads in the war against ISIS and in diplomatic efforts to resolve the 
Syrian armed conflict, and that it has been getting approval and co-operation from 
several Arab leaders such as Iraqi Prime-Minister, and Kurdish leader, and from 
many European countries such as Turkey, Germany, Italy and France that have 
now come to terms with the realities of the civil war (Ramani, 2015). Russia seeks 
a leadership role in the war against Jihad as an opportunity to boost its positive 
image in the Middle East and in Central Asia (Plakoudas, 2015). Its intervention in 
the Syrian civil war is therefore purposively to curb the threat of terrorism in Syria 
which has made political settlement of the conflict impossible (“Russia’s 
intervention”, 2015).  
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Ideology is central to Russia’s activity in the civil war. Russia is supporting the al-
Assad regime in defence of its ideological orientation towards the Middle East, 
which is at variance with those of the United States and other western countries. 
Russia doubts whether democracy will succeed in the Middle East and strongly 
believes that the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, which the West so much clamours 
for, will not create a genuine democracy in Syria. Instead, it will create an 
aggressive Islamist Sunni regime which will become a nightmare for the entire 
region. Hence, Russia’s foreign policy and international politics in the Middle East 
has been to support secular Arab nationalist regimes, such as the al-Assad regime 
of Syria, because these regimes have been instrumental in reining in fundamentalist 
Islam, and are preferable, no matter their deficiencies, to a government of radical 
Islamists. Russians believe that the United States incites public demonstrations for 
democratic reforms in the Middle East only to overthrow governments and create a 
very different situation instead. However, Russia enjoys all the latitude to strongly 
protect the Assad regime because it has observed that the United States does not 
really want to intervene against the regime, given its atypical behaviour of seeking 
UNSC permission before it can lead a military action against the regime (Ziadeh, 
Hadar, Katz, & Heydemann, 2012).  
 
7. Resurgent Russia Wants a High Place in the World 
Another scholarly view of the reason Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war is 
founded on Realism which is also known as the Realist/Power-politics School. 
Realism is one of the most prominent and compelling classic theories of all times 
which has shaped the discipline of international relations. It was pre-eminent in the 
years after 1940 and during the Cold War and was revived in the 1980s as neo-
realism. Realism is originally traceable to the ancient Greeks and particularly to 
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War in which power politics was first 
used as an approach to characterize the origins of international conflict. It was later 
traced to Machiavelli in The Prince (1513) and Hobbes in Leviathan (1651). In 
modern times, its most notable adherents include H. J. Morgenthau, G. 
Schwarzenberger, N. Spykman, M. Wight, G. F. Kennan, R. Neibuhr, and J. Herz 
among others (Evans & Newnham, 1998). The thrust of this school of thought is 
that the desire of a nation-state to preserve its national survival in a hostile 
international system makes it to prioritize acquisition of power as a foreign policy 
objective, which it in turn projects either as economic or military force, or 
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otherwise in trying to get other countries to do what it wants (Evans & Newnham, 
1998; Holmes, 2004). Since States, the arch-actors in international relations, are 
inevitably bound to relate with other States in a lawless and savage international 
system, the ultimate goal of statecraft has to be the pursuit of national survival 
which makes the acquisition of power for such survival a necessary, appropriate 
and prudent enterprise of foreign policy (Evans & Newnham, 1998).  
The argument of this school relates to Russia’s attitude towards the West with 
regards to the Syrian civil war. Scholars who argue from the Realist approach 
generally contend that the desire of Russia to ensure its national survival in a 
hostile international system makes it to prioritize the use of power as a foreign 
policy tool which it projects in the Syrian civil war as military might in trying to 
get other countries, particularly the West, to do what it wants. Accordingly, it has 
been observed that since relations between Russia and the West declined sharply 
due to Russia’s commitment to defend the Bashar al-Assad regime from western 
military overthrow, after allowing the West to intervene in Libya in early 2011, 
western observers have concluded that the greatest reason Russia is protecting the 
Bashar al-Assad regime is to safeguard it naval facility in Syria’s port of Tartus and 
to maintain its lucrative arms sales to Syria. However, these reasons do not qualify 
as a strong explanation of Russia’s defence of the al-Assad regime from collapsing 
because Russia’s military base in Tartus is practically symbolic as it cannot play 
any substantial role in Russia’s major naval operations and strategy in the 
Mediterranean. Instead, Russia wants Bashar al-Assad to remain in power for some 
bigger reason – the shared general atmosphere in Russia that reflects “the 
Kremlin’s traditional aversion to unilateral Western interventionism” and that 
supports counteracting “Western meddling and expansionism” (Pukhov, 2012, p. 
2).  
Russia is worried about western expansion in the Middle East and fears the 
possible consequences the loss of Syria would have on its own national interests, 
particularly security interest. Most importantly, the Kremlin fears that losing Syria 
to the West will be a grave harm to its national pride and interest as well as a 
catastrophic loss of its only surviving stronghold in the Middle East. Russia’s 
foreign policy towards Syria is not influenced particularly by the current armed 
conflict in the country but by a combination of all extant factors and how the 
Kremlin reacts to them psychologically. President Putin’s raised sense of self-
preservation and consolidation of power amidst threat to his government by “a 
growing protest movement that receives political endorsement from the West” also 
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makes him to share Bashar al-Assad’s predicament and to see the need to support 
him (Pukhov, 2012, p. 2).  
Russia is using its power in the UNSC as well as its diplomatic influence and 
military activity in Syria to prevent the West from being able to intervene in Syria 
militarily. It does not want the West to intervene militarily in the Syrian armed 
conflict for whatever reason because it senses that behind the West’s proposal for 
military intervention in Syria on humanitarian ground lies a covert desire to 
externally execute regime change in the country which Russia is not ready to allow. 
Russia renounces and does not want the further spread of western values and 
interference in the wealthy Middle East to extend to Syria which has been a vitally 
important dependant on Russian weapons. Russia strongly believes it risk losing 
Syria to the West if the latter succeeds in executing military intervention in the 
former. Even though such intervention is for a different mission, Russia argues that 
the West will use it eventually to topple the Syrian regime just like it did in Libya 
where it fought battle with the Libyan regime under the pretext of implementing 
UNSC Resolution 1973 (Jafarova, 2014). 
Russia wants to project its international power, pressure the United States to treat it 
as an equal superpower in international negotiation, and demonstrate to the world 
its objection and opposition to foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of 
countries undergoing crisis. Russia is using its defence of the Assad regime in the 
Syrian armed conflict to demonstrate these interests and its firm stance on them, 
and not because Moscow is obsessed with Bashar al-Assad himself or because it 
has total control over the Syrian government (Khatib, 2014). What Russia is also 
trying to do is to retain and rebuild its existing alliances in the Middle East. 
Accordingly, Russia is supporting the Assad regime in Syria’s civil war because 
the regime is Russia’s longstanding reliable ally whose continuity can only 
guarantee the maintenance of Russia’s interests (Janik, 2013). Intervening in Syria 
is also part of Russia’s plan to restrain the United States’ dominant influence in the 
Middle East and to break US containment policy against Russia which it has began 
doing by improving relations with Arab nations and other nations that have dispute 
with the United States. Russia and Syria have cultivated good and reliable relations 
that began in 1946 after they both signed a secret agreement to co-operate on 
several political issues on the platform of socialism. Moreover, the strategic 
location of Syria – neighbouring Israel, a dependable ally of the United States 
which is Russia’s major competitor – also makes Syria vitally important to Russia. 
Russia and Syria also have military co-operation established following Syria’s 
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experiences during the Cold War era, particularly during the Suez Crisis of 1956. 
The bond of friendship derived from these relationships endears the Assad-led 
Syria to Russia (Yazici, 2015). 
Similar to the perspectives of Ziadeh, Hadar, Katz, & Heydemann (2012) and 
Pukhov (2012), objection has been made to the dominant argument among several 
western scholars that, contrary to its original goal of combating Islamist terrorism, 
Russia has turned from fighting ISIS to fighting the FSA because it needed to 
defend and preserve its only ally in the Middle East, Bashar al-Assad, in order to 
protect its strategic, economic and military interests in Syria. Rather, it is argued 
differently that, considering that Russia has been seriously affected financially and 
diplomatically in the Sunni majority Middle East since it entered the Syrian civil 
war, there must be a greater reason for intervening in the civil war on the side of 
the al-Assad regime. The reason is about using its military campaign against ISIS 
to project itself as a “power broker” and also as a linchpin among anti-western 
nations. Russia dislikes how the United States unilaterally controls the international 
system because it has so much to lose in such a one-way directional system. So, by 
supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime, Russia seeks to encourage multipolarism 
and a multilateral approach to solving international conflict, as well as to 
discourage US ambition of dominating and Americanizing the world, because 
achieving these goals helps Russia to exercise its power effectively. Regarding this, 
President Putin is using his support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria’s civil war to 
inform its allies, loyalists, and prospective allies that, unlike the United States that 
abandons allies in times of conflict and adversity, Russia is a power to trust in 
times of trouble (Ramani, 2015). He is also already courting new alliances with 
nations that have troubled relations with the US and the EU, by negotiating “arms 
contracts, alliances and energy deals” with them (Ramani, 2015, p. 2). Hence, 
Russia is fighting in Syria to defend its international image, challenge the US-led 
western dominated international system, reassure its allies of its support and inform 
the world that Russia is, once again, a great power to listen to. 
The core intentions of Russia in the Syrian civil war are to actualize “Putin’s 
“eternal” rule and Russia’s triumphant return to the global scene as a power with 
which to contend” (Machnikowski, 2015, p. 27). Russia aims to create a multipolar 
world order in which the United States’ putative superpower status and global 
supremacy will be eroded and Russia will emerge as a great power and centre of 
influence which regional hegemons across the world will look to for support. 
Russia’s forceful behaviour in Syria is also meant to draw western attention to its 
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vast military power and to the global danger of disregarding Russia’s interests and 
sidelining it in international conflict resolution process. Moreover, Russia’s anti-
western action in Syria, which started with the ruse and guise of fighting ISIS, 
dovetails with Putin’s broader plan to cause chaos, crisis and destabilization for the 
West, the EU (that has incurred fragility from acrimonious wrangling over refugee 
issues and migration policy) and NATO, and to sabotage the United States’ global 
hegemony and influence in the Middle East on the one hand, and to improve 
strategic alliance with Iran on the other hand (Machnikowski, 2015).  Russia is 
using its war against Islamist groups such as ISIL to test its new military strategy 
and sophisticated weapons (Plakoudas, 2015). 
Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war is partly to support the Syrian regime 
with whom it has a longstanding and reliable alliance since the 1950s during the 
Soviet era and partly to force the United States and other western nations to accept 
Russia’s position over the conflict in Ukraine (Ibrahim, 2017). There is also a 
domestic political reason for Russia’s military intervention in Syria. It is the desire 
to re-establish a strong confidence and national pride in the generality of the 
Russian people who felt demoralized, disconcerted and depressed after Russia lost 
its global superpower status and pride following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. During the period of decline, Russia sat idly by and watched helplessly as the 
United States led military campaigns against former Yugoslavia and Iraq. So, to 
correct the disheartening situation, Russian President Vladimir Putin has firmly 
prioritized programmes aimed at reviving Russian military power and returning 
Russia once again to the global stage as a major player (Kim, 2017). With its action 
in Syria, Russia seeks to revive its leverage and policies in the Middle East more 
strongly in order to re-establish itself as a powerful player in the region and to get 
other nations to allow it to lead in the crafting of a new Middle East strategy. By 
fighting terrorism in Syria and in the Levant, Russia has advanced its power in the 
Middle East and the Mediterranean to compensate for the strategic advantages it 
lost in the region and in Ukraine. Russia wants to check Saudi Arabia’s, Qatar’s 
and Turkey’s regional goals in the current order of the region. It craves to make all 
Assad’s allies to support its efforts in using its leverage and leadership to create a 
new regional strategy (Kahf, 2016).  
Russia has made a resolute decision to use its military power in Syria and 
diplomatic power in the UNSC to frustrate all western efforts and proposals to lead 
external military intervention and execute regime change in Syria. “Military, 
industrial, religious, intelligence-gathering and so on” factors constitute the basis of 
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Russia’s strong relationship with Syria, but they are not the interests Russia seeks 
in Syria or the reasons it is protecting Bashar al-Assad (Charap, 2013, p. 1). 
Instead, there is the thinking in Russia that the post-intervention circumstances the 
United States created in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya since the Cold War 
ended have seriously destabilized the international system, and that there is no 
reason to allow it to create another regime change in Syria because allowing that 
will further destabilize the international system and may even embolden the United 
States to advance to incite or cause regime change in Russia in the future. Hence, 
Russia does not want to approve something that can be used against it someday. It 
believes that the United States wants to intervene in Syria and change the Assad 
regime not on account of displeasure over Syria’s humanitarian crisis the regime is 
accused of causing, but because it wants to expand its selfish geopolitical ambition 
to Syria since the Syrian regime opposes it and support its enemy, Iran. In a 
nutshell, “Russia’s stance on international action on the Syrian crisis has more to 
do with anxieties about the implications of US power than it does with Syria itself” 
(Charap, 2013, p. 2).  
Russia believes the West was behind the Syrian conflict starting, because they want 
to change the Syrian regime. NATO’s flagrant abuse of the May 2011 UNSC 
resolution 1973 – which clearly mandated NATO to enforce a “no-fly-zone” over 
Libya’s airspace for the humanitarian purpose of preventing aerial bombardment of 
civilian targets by Libya’s regime forces – by aiding fractious rebels to kill the 
Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi (Russia’s ally), and implement regime change 
proved true Putin’s premonition and outcry that the UN mission was going to be a 
cover for NATO to execute regime change in Libya. The appalling incident 
aggrieved and provoked Russian ruling elite to strongly oppose any form of foreign 
military intervention in Syria while simultaneously spearheading some negotiations 
for a political settlement of the armed conflict, especially as they perceive that the 
West is pursuing its own self-centred interests in the war. Russia is disillusioned 
with the West for betraying trust and using the pretext of implementing UNSC 
resolution 1973 to execute regime change in Libya and, thus, will not accept 
western military intervention in Syria. Vladimir Putin had criticized former 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev because his administration abstained from 
vetoing UNSC resolution 1973 which allowed the West to implement regime 
change in Libya. Now he is president, his opposition to a similar western proposed 
intervention in Syria has become a central part of Russia’s foreign policy. The 
Libyan experience convinces Russia that if it permits military intervention in Syria, 
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it will be allowing what happened in Libya to recur in Syria of which there will be 
no democracy except expansion of US interests. To this, Russia offers diplomatic 
and military supports, among others, to the Syrian regime against the Syrian rebels 
and their western and Arab patrons in order to prevent the occurrence in Syria of 
the dismal situation created in Libya, given that the civil war has gone international 
and the West and its Arab allies, contrary to international law, have been covertly 
and overtly providing the rebels with military, technical, economic and financial 
supports, among others, to the point that the Syrian regime’s fall was imminent 
without external help. This is apt because while the Russian government strongly 
believes in the principle of non-interference in a sovereign country’s domestic 
affairs, it also needs to protect its vital interests in Syria as Syria is Russia’s last 
stronghold in the Middle East with which it has a reliable long-lasting alliance and 
where it can easily exercise influence and counter-balance the United States. 
(Baev, 2011; Kildron, 2012; Lesch, 2012; Rather, Ali, & Abbas 2015; Ramani, 
2015; Avenäs, 2016; Perišić, 2017).  
Russia is worried about western bias against only the Syrian regime which 
reflected in their draft resolutions that seek to sanction only the regime but allow 
room which the Syrian opposition can exploit to sabotage peace plans without 
punishment. The decision of Russia to protect the Bashar al-Assad regime and 
frustrate western schemes to overthrow it also derives partly from its 
disappointment in the West over Libya and partly from the desire for retaliation 
against them for refusing to compensate it in post-Gaddafi Libya.  Russia had 
envisaged that the West would recompense it with some economic benefits for 
sacrificing its real economic interests in Gaddafi’s Libya after its abstention from 
vetoing UNSC resolution 1973 enabled the West to implement regime change 
there. Unfortunately, the West did not only dash this hope; it is also determined to 
overthrow the Syrian regime and end Russia’s economic interest in Syria. Russia 
believes the West has some ulterior sinister motives against the Syrian government 
and would most likely abuse any UNSC-sanctioned military intervention in order 
to achieve the motives just like they did in Libya and created a bloody regime 
change there (Janik, 2013). Russia is also opposed to western intervention in Syria 
because such intervention would not only lead to regime change of a loyal ally but 
would also cause a decline of Russia’s influence in the Middle East as a 
consequence (Buckley, 2012).  
The West sees Russia as being paradoxical in that while it acquiesced to UNSC 
resolution for military intervention in Libya for humanitarian reason based on the 
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UN principle of “Responsibility to Protect”, it has effectively thwarted the UNSC’s 
efforts to apply the same measure in Syria. Russia’s ironic stance is judged not 
unintelligent, however; it suits the preservation of its national interest (Zifcak, 
2012). Russia does not want Syria to be divided because the wisdom hindsight and 
lessons learnt from the Colour Revolution in former Soviet countries, coupled with 
NATO’s mischief in Libya where Russia consequently lost huge economic 
advantages and assets by stopping arms trade and operation of oil rigs, have taught 
it to take a decisive position against proposed western intervention in Syria. For 
this reason, Russia is supporting the Syrian government to avoid suffering the same 
losses it suffered in Libya following the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi (Yazici, 
2015). By tenaciously supporting Bashar al-Assad, blocking UNSC draft 
resolutions, and being impervious to diplomatic overtures from the West and their 
Arab allies, Russia is punishing the West whilst demonstrating its disappointment 
in them for betraying it and for abusing the mandate of “no-fly zone” in Libya. 
Russia does not want the same thing to happen in Syria no matter western pressure 
(Ziadeh, Hadar, Katz, & Heydemann, 2012).  
 
8. Russia Looks to Itself for Help 
Similar to the Realist/Power-politics School, some other scholars argue from the 
perspective of the sixth, Self-help, school to assert that by intervening directly in 
the Syrian civil war, Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to restore Russia to its 
former status as a superpower, having lost trust in the West. The central argument 
of this school of thought is that when sovereign States are confronted by events that 
constitute threats to their national survival and advancement in the anarchical 
international system, they are naturally gravitated towards the use of force for self-
defence and self-preservation, which are requirements of self-help. Since the 
international system is ungoverned and lawless, “self-defence”, “self-reliance” and 
“self-preservation” become crucially important security goals of sovereign States 
in pursuance of their fundamental desire to promote their national survival and 
advancement. “States answer to no higher authority and so must look to themselves 
to protect their interests and to ensure survival” (Evans & Newnham, 1998, p. 36). 
In doing this, “self-defence is regarded as the most basic manifestation and 
requirement of the institution of self-help … [which has] balance of power and 
collective security [as] variants of it, not alternatives.” Moreover, “the search for 
security in a system of politics without government means that self-help is a 
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necessary function of self-preservation. It is a natural response to the security 
dilemma as traditionally conceived” (Evans & Newnham, 1998, p. 41). 
Accordingly, Lukyanov (2016) argues that Putin’s military activity in Syria is 
inclined towards restoring Russia’s former superpower status because he can no 
longer trust the West as honest partners who respect Russia and its wellbeing. 
Russia’s anti-western military action in Syria’s civil war is a clear message to the 
West that Russia is reclaiming its power – which they believed it lost to the United 
States when the Soviet Union disintegrated – to re-establish itself as a superpower. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine buttresses this message to the West.  
Russia disagrees with western belief that it lost the Cold War when the Soviet 
Union ended in 1991, that it will continue to decline in power, and that since 1991 
the United States has remained the only superpower and thus should be accorded 
the right to global leadership. Instead, Russia contends that even after the end of 
the Soviet Union, a unipolar world order dominated by the United States never 
emerged. Rather, a multipolar world order has emerged in which Russia has an 
enormous global role to play and in which mutual co-operation – like the 
successful ones between Russia and the United States over the destruction of 
Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile –  is necessary to constructively manage 
international conflicts, and such co-operation is critical in stopping the United 
States from further distorting the sacrosanct  principles of the Cold War era 
international system such as “… balance of power, respect for sovereignty, 
noninterference in other States’ internal affairs, and the need to obtain the UN 
Security Council’s approval before using military force” (Lukyanov, 2016, p. 30-
31).  
The EU and NATO have expanded into Eastern Europe, which used to be a Cold 
War-era buffer zone, up to Russia’s neighbouring States. NATO had demonstrated 
an aggressive character post-Cold War as manifested in the overthrow of Serbian 
leader, Slobodan Milosevic, in the Kosovo War in 1999; in the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2002, Iraq in 2004 and Libya in 2011, as well as in the ouster of the 
anti-western regimes in these States. These antagonistic developments make 
Russian President Putin to think that the glorious new world order envisioned by 
Soviet leaders – who for that reason compromised to end the Cold War – has been 
rejected by the West which, rather than appreciate the wisdom of those Soviet 
leaders, has now determined to strip Russia of its great powers. In light of this fact, 
Russia is using its military action in Syria to inform the United States that it has to 
deal with Russia as a co-equal in handling international conflicts, rather than as a 
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subordinate. Russia is discontented with western expansionist behaviour in the 
Middle East that contravenes the principles of international law. It is fighting in 
Syria to restore its lost glory and to reclaim its superpower status (Lukyanov, 
2016). Therefore, Russia’s action in the Syrian civil war is to tell the West that 
Russia remains an indispensible power in the world. Since the 1999 Kosovo War 
when NATO bombarded Serbia in disregard of Russia’s earnest objection, the 
West has continued to see Russia as an irrelevant player in international politics. 
The Syrian civil war therefore serves as an opportunity for Russia to disprove the 
West and to counteract United States’ unbridled efforts to rule the world (Ramani, 
2015).  
 
9. Summary and Conclusion 
The thrust of this paper deals with the rationale behind Russia’s military 
intervention in the Syrian civil war to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power. 
This is particularly important because the protracted civil war in Syria has become 
a major global issue and also because of the ambiguity associated with 
understanding why Russia is involved in the war in support of Bashar al-Assad. 
Close analysis of a wide range of literature on the subject-matter revealed six sets 
of scholarly explanations each of which is founded on a theoretical basis. The 
accounts of the six schools of thought provide deep insight into why Russia chose 
to support the Syrian government in the Syrian civil war. The first account hinges 
on geopolitics, and posits that Russia’s military intervention in Syria is intended to 
protect its geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic interests and sphere of 
influence which are crucially important to its national security and defence. 
Securing these interests is thought to enhance Russia’s military and strategic 
posture in the entire Middle East, reinforce its naval presence in Syria’s port of 
Tartus and military operations in the Mediterranean, increase its influence over 
energy economics, and make it a key player in Middle East affairs.  
Another account centres on conservatism in its analysis. It maintains that Russian 
leaders are staunch conservatives and as such they abhor the Syrian revolution 
aimed at deposing the government of Syria, especially because the revolution is 
externally sponsored and untimely, and will be cataclysmic in end. Thus, Russia is 
bent on counteracting the revolution in Syria and determined to halt the course of 
the Arab Spring from engulfing authoritarian States in the broader Middle East. 
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Russia prioritizes stability in the Middle East and consequently rejects revolution 
against the region’s historic authoritarian political system which it benefits from. 
Furthermore, Russia considers external military intervention against the Syrian 
regime as inappropriate, illegal and contrary to international law and the principles 
of the UN. This legalistic account stresses that Russia deployed its diplomatic and 
military powers against the anti-Assad wishes of the West and their Arab allies not 
only to protect the Syrian regime, but essentially to uphold the principles of the UN 
and international laws that relate to respect for State sovereignty and non-
interference, which the West never mind abusing to satisfy their selfish interests. 
The audacious defence of these international values makes Russia a defender of 
international norms and law. Hence, Russia is saving the world in Syria. 
While Russia is committed to protect these values in Syria at all cost, it is also 
drawn into the country’s civil war in order to decimate Islamist terrorist groups like 
ISIS and prevent Islamist radicalism and terrorism from spreading to Russia, 
especially to the North Caucasus, and to Central Asia and other Middle East 
countries, fearing that a region-wide entrenchment of Islamist fundamentalism and 
terrorism will spell doom for the Middle East. Russia’s desire to curb Jihadist 
activity, sectarian sentiments and Islamist fundamentalism that characterize the 
Syrian civil war is inspired by its abhorrence of Jihadist ideology, sectarianism and 
Islamist fundamentalism. The primordialist and instrumentalist schools of thought 
greatly bear on this point. They argue that religious sectarianism and Islamist 
fundamentalism are primordial values which have been rendered instrumental in 
shaping the cause of the civil war.  
The realist account maintains that Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian civil 
war is motivated by the desire to use its military might to confront the West over 
the Syrian conflict and to ensure its national survival in a hostile international 
system. Russia is opposed to the West’s bold expansion to former Soviet Space and 
in the Middle East, and believes it wants to exploit the Syrian civil war to spread its 
expansionist goal to Syria, as such behaviour is directly opposed to Russia’s 
interests and is intended to harm its national security in the long run. Consequently, 
Russia deploys its military and political might as countermeasures to overcome the 
West’s anti-Russian strategy and particularly to prevent the United States from 
extending its control and influence to Syria. Russia’s struggle with the West in 
Syria is partly aimed at achieving its bigger ambition of reclaiming its lost glory 
and returning to the global stage as a great power to reckon with in international 
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affairs, and also aimed at restoring the principles of the Cold War era international 
system such as balance of power, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in other 
States’ internal affairs, and the need to obtain the UNSC’s approval before using 
military force externally. 
The self-help account contends that Russia is confronted by serious incidents – the 
Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war and western antagonism among others – that 
threaten its national survival and advancement and as such it is naturally compelled 
to use its military forces for self-defence and self-preservation.  
Despite the fact that all the schools of thought presented in this paper agree that all 
of Russia’s supports to the Syrian regime are orientated ultimately towards 
protecting Russia’s interests in Syria and in the broader Middle East, they disagree 
on what those interests are exactly and thus provide different accounts to explain 
Russia’s military intervention in Syria’s civil war in support of Bashar al-Assad. 
Altogether, the prolonged civil war in Syria has long become a regional and global 
concern. It has pitched several external actors against each other depending on 
where their interests lie or which internal actors to the armed conflict they support. 
While Russia leads the camp that supports the Syrian regime against the Syrian 
rebels, the United States leads the camp that supports the Syrian rebels against the 
Syrian regime. The great powers leading the two opposing camps are logically 
enmeshed in a proxy war. As the civil war is already complicated, the acrimony 
and power struggle between Russia and the United States may lead to a major 
military confrontation in the Middle East, with untold ramifications. 
Although the geopolitical, conservative, legalistic, primordial and instrumental, and 
self-help schools of thought make compelling arguments concerning why Russia 
intervened in the Syrian civil war to support the Bashar al-Assad regime, the realist 
school of thought provides the best and most important explanation to the question 
of this paper. This is because every other explanation will be inconsequential 
without the realist steps taken by the Russian government. The realist school of 
thought states that since the international system is hostile and ungoverned, nations 
which seeks to protect their interests amidst opposition naturally turn to the use of 
physical force to pursue the interests, thereby making true the axiom, “might is 
right”. The desire to protect national interests in Syria and to prevent Syrian rebel 
groups and their external patrons from ousting the Syrian regime will not have 
been achieved if it was never matched with pragmatic action and tremendous 
military might by the Russian government. 
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